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THE Cabinet has approved the draft proposal to amend the Constitution and vest the power of 
impeachment of judges of the Supreme Court in the Parliament. The fundamental issue now is 
how the law should be framed so that it achieves its professed goal i.e. ensures accountability of 
the Supreme Court judges. This article will deal with one aspect that the proposed law on this 
issue may contain to reduce the scope for misuse.    
Vesting the power in the Parliament in itself is not a bad thing and if crafted well, may function 
better than the current system of Supreme Judicial Council (SJC). A good outcome of the 
proposed amendment to the Constitution is that the process of impeachment would gain the 
much needed transparency. In the past, allegations against judges may have been investigated by 
the SJC, but the public has not been able to know what the recommendations of the council were. 
In today's world, when transparency is gaining more and more importance, it is unacceptable that 
such an important matter should escape public gaze and be swept under the carpet. 
On the other hand, politically motivated criticism and skepticism aside, the critics of the 
proposed amendment have question marks about power the Parliament will exercise, mainly 
because they lack faith in the democratic culture of our political parties. History of the 
impeachment power (or more appropriately the veiled threat of its use) by the Parliament in 
Bangladesh would also make many apologists wonder about the smooth functioning of the 
proposed mechanism. 
In not so distant a past, Mr. A.Q.M. Badruddzoa Chowdhury, a former President of Bangladesh, 
had to resign from his post because of the prospect of impeachment by the Parliament. There was 
no credible allegation of physical or mental incapacity or misconduct against him. Nonetheless, 
he had to resign because the then Prime Minster, Begum Khaleda Zia and her colleagues were 
not convinced about his loyalty to the party or was displeased with his perceived venture to 
create an image of being a personality who could go beyond petty party politics. There was 
widespread insinuation in newspaper reports at that time that by not visiting General Ziaur 
Rahman's grave on his death anniversary he infuriated the high ups in the ruling party and was 
accused of hurting the party's sentiment. 
When the President of the Republic has to suffer such indignity on flimsy grounds, simply 
because he has lost favour of the party that appointed him, it is not certain that a judge of the 
Supreme Court would be immune to the wrath of the ruling party on fragile grounds. One can 
argue that after all Mr. Chowdhury was a politician and when he lost confidence of the political 
party that nominated him for the post there was none to defend him. A judge, being a non-
partisan person, would be more difficult to dislodge in such a disgraceful way. That said he has 
no backers but his office and the power accompanying it, support of the bar, and public 
confidence. The judges are secluded from public and when a government with a two-third 
majority would proceed with the impeachment motion of a judge on not so cogent evidence, it is 
uncertain how much would public sentiment be able to protect him. Thus, the possibility of 
whimsical exercise of power remains. 
It is well known that because of the provisions in Article 70 of the Constitution on voting in the 
Parliament, the MPs are barred from voting against party decisions. Many analysts have 
identified it as an obstacle to effective functioning of the Parliament and advocate its complete 
repeal. But it must not be forgotten that the practice of horse-trading of MPs is not unknown in 
Bangladesh. It is also quite common in this country that when a politician fails to secure the 
nomination of his political party, he /she swiftly joins another party. Hence, wholesale abolition 
of Article 70 is a complex issue and beyond the scope of this short article. Instead, the proposed 
Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution may provide that in case of voting on an impeachment 
motion of a judge, the MPs would be allowed to caste conscience vote, that is, they can vote 
according to their conscience rather than on party lines. With the current state of hierarchical 
politics, the effectiveness of this mechanism is uncertain but this would give MPs a chance to 
respond to the calls of their conscience, not that of the leaders of their respective parties. This 
can also be a test case for further amendment or complete abolition of Article 70 in future. 
Of course, the defenders of the proposed Amendment to the Constitution would argue that the 
power of impeachment of judges would be exercised by the Parliament very judiciously and on 
the basis of a credible accusation followed by a scrupulous inquiry (which would include giving 
the concerned judge an opportunity of presenting her/his arguments). After all, the parliament is 
accountable to the people and impeachment of a judge on unfounded accusations would not be 
accepted by the people, they would argue. Such accountability to the public should be an 
effective safeguard against any capricious exercise of the impeachment power by a government 
with an overwhelming majority in the house. Only time will tell if our democracy has matured 
enough to ensure this but precedents say otherwise. 
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